The following is a brief presentation of the polemical strategies of textual discourses during the Great Schism. Our aim is to think of the history of the Great Schism as the history of the symbolic violence shaping the debates. The paper suggests joining the recent movement of what Jean-Pascal Gay calls »a cultural history of the controversial fact« to better grasp the ecclesiological advances of this late medieval period.
Obediencia, reformatio and veritas
The period of the Great Schism, a brief but dense historical constellation, allows us to bring the heuristic tools suggested by these perspectives to bear: we can not only study polem ical exchanges and their links to socio-historic realities, but also inquire about the cultural productivity of the debates themselves, the practices they engendered or pushed aside, and the way they produced redistributions or new balances of power. As such an approach can uncover, debates themselves can become objects of history, appropriating the issues of a conflict and bringing the basis of political and factual dynamics to light.
To put it differently, debates are not just interesting because of their content and arguments, but also as historical objects in themselves -and indeed even as historical actors or forces, which may very well effect specific transformations. We may thus engage in an approach which aims to establish a ›polemology‹, though this does not necessarily mean that polemical discourses or their contents should be central for their own sake. Rather, the issue at stake is the ›culture of conflict‹, and the goal is to write a ›cultural history of controversies‹.
To break this down to concrete methodical concerns, we can depart from the assumption that debates occur in a precise context of production with bases, sources and textual networks. Such backgrounds enable us to construct a framework of the debates within the temporal context of the events. As a next step, we can describe the practices of the debates in a phenomenological approach providing a thorough description. Further questions may concern the genres of the debate, its rhythm, the circulation of the debates, the strategies of engagement, the resulting networks, their solidarities, affiliations and allegiances as well as the issues of the debates. The function of such a narrative and phenomenological approach is to situate the roots of the specific genre of debate in its context, its conditions of possibilities as well as in its practices, in order to observe the production of intellectual or doctrinal content at work.
To provide an example illustrating this approach, the following pages will develop the central issue of the period set out by Gerson in the opening quotation above -that is, the concept of obedientia, or rather, its inversion, the jus resistendi. This example can help us to follow the interpenetration of doctrinal issues and debates, documenting how debates produce doctrines. The discussion of this issue began with preliminary works in the years 1395-1396. A seminal text in which everything was concentrated was then produced with the well-known Simon of Cramaud's De substraccione obedience, also called Nunc reges intelli gite! The issues raised at this point then continued to be debated until 1418. Particular texts throughout this development allow us to follow the reception of the idea of a jus resistendi, in the form of rejections, reluctances or adhesions. A particular thread which can be highlighted as a coherent development concerns the frequent use of the exegesis of Galatians 2. 11, an episode in which Paul resists Peter. The later episodes of the debate played on controversial exegesis, with texts responding to each other and establishing deeper connections. The follow ing discussion will remain close to the exegesis of Galatians 2. 11 to keep the argumentation focused.
Paul in front of Peter: the exegesis of a model of resistance (Galatians 2. 11)
The polemical literature of the Great Schism abundantly drew its models of behavior and its rhetorical justifications from biblical figures. Biblical history showed that it was not unusual for inferiors to correct or reprimand (reprehendere) their immediate superiors. The examples quoted were all the more convincing as the inferiors addressed the political elders even if these were Moses, David, Achaz, Sedecias, Herod or Peter. The most developed biblical example is that of Paul who resisted Peter, qui in facie restitit.
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One might say that a veritable chain of reflection spread around Galatians 2. 11 during the period under consideration, to the point of constituting an exegetic thread in which Paul was set up as a model of resistance to the Petrinian authority. He offered himself as the patron of Subtractionists, who subscribed to an attitude of resistance to their pope.
In Antioch, Paul blamed Peter for not having discerned the impropriety of an obligation of the Jewish Law concerning the converted heathen. At the heart of this attitude of resistance was one simple question: Cur ita facis?, a biblical reference to the Book of Job (9. 12). Few authors evoked the sapiential origin of the question sent to the very God who announces in the Book of Job: Quis dicere potest: Cur ita facis? ›Who can say to Him: ›What are you doing?‹‹ What are you doing is to be understood as a condemnation of the will of the superior, which presupposes some courage. Cur ita facis? could thus become a syntagm for a refusal of the omnipotence of the prince, as much as a criticism of the discretionary and despotic power of the universal pontiff. 17 The academics and other Subtractionists seized on it to justify a limitation of the plenitudo potestatis of the pope. Their gesture was all the more confrontational as the Dictatus papae, and later on the Decretum Gratiani and various theocratic arguments, had always asserted the opposite: the pope was indebted to nobody concerning his actions, he was accountable only to God, he was above discussion and could not be judged by anyone. 18 We know the assertions of the theory elaborated by Boniface VIII in 1302, according to which »the pope is above any judgement, above any disapproval and above any criticism: Cui non est qui dicat ›Cur ita faciat?‹«. 19 Thus, the question extended beyond the simple interrogation to become a more general posture, that of the resistance to arbitrary absolute power.
From jus resistendi to jus appellandi Through the course of the debates, the exegesis of the Paulinian verse demonstrated the importance of a doctrinal construction which was gradually refined: from the jus resistendi of the years 1395-1396, the theorists deduced a jus appellandi, a right of appeal which had been prepared by a sort of jus disputandi dealing with papal power and the precept of fraternal correction. In 1404, Jean Gerson, then chancellor of the University of Paris, harangued Benedict XIII at Tarascon by giving a virulent sermon.
20 This text signaled the break, or at least the estrange ment, of the chancellor with regard to the Avignonese Pope. The scene took place on January 1st of that year. The restoration or restitution of obedience had only been attained a few months before. Now, the pope had to work firmly on the union, and everyone expected him to act. In this situation, Gerson evoked the controversy of Antioch between Peter and Paul in his long sermon, formulating questions in a unique and unprecedented manner. Three doctrinal questions were elaborated around the jus resistendi:
Sed auget questionis admirationem (1) Through this series of historical fictions, Gerson widened the reflection on a jus resisten di, suggesting that the pope's stubbornness and pertinacity appealed to higher authorities. To put it another way, the right of appeal intervened when the resources of fraternal correction were exhausted. It is broadly apparent that, in spite of its use of exegesis, the subject was rooted in the most ardent questions of contemporary current events. All the themes of the moment were gathered here: the pope's stubbornness, his potential deposition, the authority of the council, the use of strength, the charge of heresy, the just reprimand and so on. In this debate, Gerson showed a lot of courage because, let us remember, the context is a sermon at Tarascon, in front of Pope Benedict XIII, just after the restitution of obedience. Yet by delivering this multiplicity of questions to the public sphere of the audience -and so to public debate -including Benedict XIII, Jean Gerson enabled a right of discussion concerning papal authority. 24 He demonstrated how one could go about discussing Peter's power, de potentia Petri disputare and, as quoted at the outset of this article, reminded his listeners of the fact that theologians were used to debating divine truth. 25 What Gerson thus denounced was the censorship, or self-censorship, of a reverential theology that discussed only in panegyric words. Furthermore, by speaking of an ›investigation‹ (inquirere, perquiri mus), he placed the ecclesiological and political debate on the footing of a theological search of a scientific type. It was not a question of being involved in controversy but of looking together, even if the appearances flirted with impropriety and with the transgression of certain tacit limits. 26 Gerson encouraged the pursuit of an inquiry, increasingly asserting that no body could know the truth of the moment nor the truth of the pope. He encouraged this inquiry not for speculative pleasure but for the sake of practical (that is to say a moral) edification: Non est disputationis speculativae actus sed aedificationis practicae.
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In his own way, by advocating the right of discussion and by encouraging the debatealbeit a serene and specialized debate -Gerson thus did nothing but spread the Paulinian question to Peter: Cur ita facis? He defended the right of criticism by reflection. He defend ed the right to mature or thoughtful obedience, as opposed to blind obedience. In his interpretation, this right to discussion was attached to the right to resistance, a resistance to arbitrary power and omnipotence by way of reasoned criticism.
The words used by contemporaries thus managed to acquire a doctrine of appeal against the pope -an appeal to the council against the pope -and a critical resistance to power. I would go so far as to say that this doctrine implied the hypothesis of a double magisterium, that of Peter and that of Paul:
28 Paul was seen to assure the doctrinal succession alongside
Peter, who embodied the hierarchical succession. 29 Paul's doctrinal arbitration was used to set him up as a paradigm of the theologian, the antonomasia of which paving the way for all other theologians. In this sense, theologians -including Gerson -as spiritual followers of the doctors, apostles and evangelists, were responsible for correcting the pope, as they were We cannot draw the history of the exegesis of Galatians 2. 11 during the Great Schism to a close without including the refutations provoked by this new line of argument. In the pontificalist camp, from very early on Paul's resistance to Peter was seen as an irreverent (irrevecunde) resistance.
31 From the beginning of its history, the Subtractionist exegesis of the Paulinian resistance had its detractors: the pope's advocates and the anti-Subtractionists. Not least among them, Nicolas Eymerich, for example, strove to refute the jus resistendi based on the premises of its elaboration in 1395. Seen in context, it was a question of reaffirming that Peter was positioned above Paul because of the delegations of mission he had received from Christ himself. 32 As Nicholas argued, the papal statute was apart, that is to say beyond, the law. He defended the sacrosanct non-justiciability of the pope by anyone. 33 Then followed the canonical and implacable argument: whoever resisted the established power resisted God, qui huic potestati a Deo ordinate resistit, Dei ordinacioni resistit.
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To sum up, the exegesis of the verse Galatians 2. 11 provided an occasion to spread and to specify the doctrine of the right of resistance against the supreme pontiff of the Roman Church, which was expressed in different ways: the right to discussion and disputatio, the right to criticism, the right to fraternal correction (law of fraternal correction), the right of reprimand, the right of appeal. About the ecclesiological constructions, then as in the time of the early Christians and again during the Gregorian period and the Investiture Contest, the rate of advance of the one was determined by the other.
Debating about reformatio
In the course of the debates, the reflections about the right to resistance against pontifical power became closely linked to reflections on the theme of reformatio, which also acquired the function of a check on absolute power. To contemporary thinkers, reformatio started to be seen as a way of building a limitatio of the pontifical plenitudo potestatis. Stimulated by the sphere of controversies, each of the ecclesiological positions within the debates, traditional or more innovative, then worked to establish an understanding of reformatio which corresponded its own doctrinal constructions. 39 Yet this re-use at the very heart of the Council of Constance transformed them into a real political program, and lent them a new breath and a new amplitude. Now based on a maturation of the minds, this program found its natural bed in Constance. Decades of debates and polemics on surrounding themes had been needed, but eventually the issue of reform emerged in 1414-1415, and became a center polarizing neighboring debates. Yet, for many, it was the council itself that brought reform. Many expectations and plans for a better future revolved closely around the reform-by -council. Altogether, we can note that the interpretation of reformatio as limitatio and its polarization of all aspirations were remarkable and ecclesiologically bold. By aiming to be limitatio, the reform authorized theorists to think of ecclesiological forms for notable counter-powers facing papal authority: the council, of course, but also the bishops, the cardinals, and, last but not least, the king. The question raised by this development of diverging positions was, inevitably, that of veritas. Together with obedientia and reformatio, the word veritas saturated texts of the second phase of the Schism, and indeed helps to identify the affiliations and the camps. It was the signature of the ideological positions and informed about the identical allegiances. From the outset, veritas was seized by the pontifical rhetoric and, more profoundly, by the pontifical episteme. This regime of the truth, that is to say of a particular construction and meaning of the term, was developed by the pope and his jurists, who, fundamentally, thought of the Schism in terms of the truth or falsehood of one or both popes. This overarching logic governed their reactions, their discourses, their speeches, and their thoughts. Yet, the truth so understood remained a weapon of battle -the battle of the previous generation. It was, specifically, a battle without discussion. The episteme of a discourse of truth excluded all debate because of its dogmatism.
Very quickly, truth was set up as dogmatism on the papal side: there was the truth of the pope. This meaning drew its desire for inquiry and its desire for conformity from the inquisitorial customs. Moreover, it precluded legitimate discussion. The dogmatism of the truth necessarily neutralized debates. Some scholars still tried hard to remind readers of the uncertainty and unreachable nature of truth in this period of doubt, and encouraged them to avoid the stumbling block of blindness or sectarianism. It should also be noted that dogma tism was not the privilege of one camp -in this particular case the pontificalist camp -though it was, to be sure, more visible there. Yet the dogmatic attitude was diffusely present everywhere; it harked back to extremism in all camps, among the Parisian academics and among the papal canonists, among the theologians and among the jurists, both within the Roman obedience and within the obedience of Avignon.
This atmosphere must be explained by latent, symbolic and ambient violence, andhaving studied intellectual and discursive practices and the doctrinal contents inferred by these discursive practices -we may now attempt to grasp this atmosphere of the time by investigating its traces in the debates. Though the study of textual debates cannot tell us all about its contexts, debates are revealing of ambient violence as much as they are responsible for it. The atmosphere indeed seems to have been one of symbolic violence -of instances of unspoken censorship and intimidation. But this violence was also the subject of the debates, and could be denounced or channeled. We can grasp some of the dynamic of forms of symbol ic violence in the discourse surrounding the University of Paris, which exhibited a considerable thirst for power and even for intellectual monopoly. Precisely because it was symbolic, the ambient violence became visible in silences in this situation, yet its furtive presence is not easily unmasked. The authors kept silent about it especially when it was heavy upon them. When they spoke about it, this means it was already mastered. We spot indications in the scruples, the confusion of the consciousness, the remorse, and the fearsin particular, the fear of reprisals and score-settling, the climate of distrust and suspicion, criticism and slander, the calls for respect. The atmosphere was heavy with the unspoken, with censorship and intimidation.
In 1402, when the so-called Epistle of Toulouse was published, for example, it denounced the climate of terror provoked by the Subtractionists. Historians have gone so far as to speak about an »intellectual terrorism« imposed by the Parisian doctors. 40 The Epistle of Toulouse, possibly drafted by Guigon Flandrin, in fact insisted on denouncing the com-pulsory, ever-present silence, the bringing-to-heel of the opposition after the vote of What one can take away from the sources is the idea that this violence was the sign of an ongoing transformation, of a kind of growth crisis of the Parisian university world -a crisis of authority and of confidence. Violence thus related closely to the re-defining of a university identity, which was defined by three characteristics: first, access to a doctrinal autonomy; second, the will to participate in the supreme power; and third, the ambition of attaining a monopoly of control over public opinion.
The claim of doctrinal autonomy was to be formulated in the magisterium of Paul, the theologian, next to that of Peter, the institutional leader, as discussed above. Concerning the will to participate in the supreme power, the University gradually drew up a real political program to overcome the ecclesial crisis from the beginning of the 1390s onwards. With the multiplicity of the texts that it published -letters, prescriptions, requests, gravamina etc. -it intended to occupy the center stage in the critical hours from August, 1392 -critical for the pope, but also for King Charles VI. What it moved forward as an incomparable trump was the strength of its expertise. This expertise allowed the university to aspire to participation with considerable legitimacy. Its role was greatly transformed with this shift: the University would no longer be the authority of determination, as traditionally, but the authority of con silium. Pierre d'Ailly intended to exercise this expert role fully at the Council of Constance. The expertise of the prelates and the academics was not to be seen as interference in the respective others' sphere of influence, but as part of the free game of the debates. A proof of this was d'Ailly's indignation when, during the council of Constance, Maurice of Prague was forbidden to argue during a debate. D'Ailly rebelled against this; the role of the doctors and the theologians was not to silence disputationes but to highlight them. 44 In a sense, the professional theologian was thus installed as a natural counselor of the powerful and a safeguard against abuse. 45 The theologian was meant to be an expert and therefore a careful man.
He was portrayed as a wise person, the one that the councils have to summon, in brief the epieikeas.
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Finally, in the redefinition of its identity and its self-awareness, the University aspired, without saying this explicitly, to the monopoly over control of public opinion. This ambition towards a monopoly can be felt subtly in the debates. It accounts for some of the virulence of the violence, masked or admitted. One stake in all the debates, throughout the course of the emergence of the Schism, and in particular, during the course of Constance, was that of control over public opinion. The known forms of constraints and pressures would, on a certain level, not only have aimed at imposing the ›University line‹ onto the politics of the kingdom, but also onto the listening public, which now exceeded the sphere of the masters and was that of ambient opinion, hence the care taken by the speakers to convince, and to convince by using all the tricks of rhetoric and logic, pathos and ethos. Masters became public figures, intellectuals in the public sphere, or to quote Daniel Hobbins's term, »public Intellectuals«. 47 Nevertheless, the outcome reconstructed by the historian uncovers the failure of this ambition, the missed dream of monopoly. The academics clearly lost their grasp on power within the period under discussion. Several signs betray this failure of their monopoly: the tension, the papers outside of the university which multiplied, the faintness of the university in general, its anger. As has been shown, the honor of the academics became so sensitive as to demand reparation for insults -for example, Jean Hayton had confronted the scholars in 1395.
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Conclusion: the polemical approach to a new history of the Great Schism
The discussion of the Great Schism presented here has envisaged the debates as events of history, and even as decisive actors. It seems possible to investigate the debates in such a way as to bring light to the structural realities they shaped, showing the Great Schism in a new light.
First of all, the debates proved to be engines of discursive production, and built doctrines. Through the examples of the discussions surrounding jus resistendi, or reformatio, or veritas, it also emerges clearly that debates produced doctrinal discursivity. Words became markers, and these markers signaled respective positions. We might say that words acquired additional meaning, which might stabilize. To contribute to a new history of the production of knowledge at the time of the Great Schism, such processes can be reconstructed in a slow and patient historical reconstruction, one text at a time, one argument at a time, within a vast intertextual constellation. Secondly, reconstructing debates in this way helps to unmask ecclesiologial and institutional games. The time of the Great Schism was indeed one of vast ecclesiological possibilities. The experiment of a subtraction of obedience became not only thinkable, but was officially applied. The ecclesiological alternatives to the monarchic government of the pope were thought through with unprecedented excitement. Everywhere, ideas about the forces of opposition, proposals of limitations to papal power, and incentives for a resistance to the full powers emerged. This period of debate was also a time of hopes for change. The un certainties of the Great Schism also encouraged expectations of new openings and new solutions. Against this background, debates were able to set conditions for the actors of time. People were caught up in the disorder of this polemical atmosphere, and the debates decided on certain personal trajectories, and vice versa, as the great debaters of the time played their own games.
The proposed approach, which situates the history of the Great Schism in a perspective focused on its polemical culture, is a challenging one. Discourses and their textual practices are revealed as much, if not more, by the open controversies as by the silences hidden in the sources. Behind the debates, we must assume passions. By scrutinizing the sources, we can partly reconstitute them -the fears, the hatreds, the vindications, the surprises, the violence, the desires, the ambitions and the frustrations.
49 Such emotions and feelings fed an atmosphere of factions and their convictions; the hour was, indeed, one of excess and extremism, of crises and emergency. Allegiances tightened. Camps hardened. Networks came to light. During the scope of one generation (1395-1418), the historian observes an ascent of sectarianism, fed by an amalgamation of the human passions with the polemism of circumstance. Far from being the privilege of one camp, the tension between dogmatism and resistance found its way into both factions. Hence the violence of this time of crisis, which remains to be researched further within the contexts of a historic anthropology of the intellectual violence of the medieval scholarly world. So far, the historicization of the ecclesiological debates of the time of the Great Schism seems to validate the hypothesis that ecclesiology and polemology remain intrinsically linked, and should be studied in the context of each other.
